

Saturday, July 17, 2010
 AllNucDocs\Proposal 10\Chapter Outline

(not in order)

(1957: At Stanford studying probability theory; visit to RAND (with paper on game theory and foreign policy, from Barrington Moore class; moonlight swim in Santa -- Monica; Alain Enthoven). Sputnik.

The Missile Gap/Deterrent Gap

My introduction to:

The Delicate Balance of Terror. R-290. Gaither Report. Vulnerability. (Decision-making under uncertainty: ambiguity of warning, hence delay, vulnerability; cures: shelters or air alert? Dangers of alerts (see Cuba II; accidents; 1969: dispersal to airports)

Pearl Harbor study

✓ Intell ests (Air Force; NIE's cut off from RAND) 1958-59. Assumptions about SU. (AJW as former Trotskyist).

Rush-Horelick: Khrushchev bluffs

Intellectual atmosphere at RAND ("You're absolutely wrong." Like the Crimson.) Inter-disciplinary.

✓ Alain and I don't sign up for TIAA-CREF. I buy fine wines (Wohlstetter) back in Cambridge.

The Theory and Practice of Blackmail

✓ Berlin crisis: Khrushchev sounding like Hitler

Quemoy crisis 1958

✓ Sputnik

✓ Me back at Society of Fellows: the hawk. (My Lowell Lectures)

✓ At RAND at midnight, reading about SU sub attack, looking out window at the sea.

Items:

✓ Possibilities for unauthorized action: (my RAND memo; Jack Carne; relation to my impulses in Mediterranean); two-man rules; authentication (envelopes); lack of PALs (Crimson Tide); alert (Kadena); Kunsan; Iwakuni; lack of Stop code (Red Alert, Dr. Strangelove; related to resistance to PALs)

Visits to CINCPAC command posts, Japan, Taiwan, 7th fleet

Delegation: 1957-58 (Quemoy); Twining/Lebanon/Kuwait/Iraq!; 1961 study; 1964 campaign, Goldwater/Twining proposals, LBJ deception; Lemay (non-insubordination); LeMay to me.

✕ My efforts to expose, Symington, Zablocki, Cronkhite, Woodward; books, Rosenblum,...; recent declassification.

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✕ War plans: CINCPAC GEOP; structure of plans in Pacific; EAM; orders to hit military targets in SU leading to attacks on cities in China; SU-CHINA plans, hard to disentangle; concern with "interference"—one plan—entirely meaningless efforts, ignoring winds and time of receipt of execute messages. (Compare WWI mobilization plans. Later, fratricide with nuclear missiles; and untested trajectories over Pole).

The question: 325 million, 600 million.

The JSCP: definition of general war; secrecy from SecDef. (Taylor)

The SIOP. Vs. "redundancy," interference. (Warheads on Moscow). "Overkill" (not reduced by SIOP: see Ike and Kisty reaction).

✕ Gates panel on Presidential C&C.
My briefings to Nitze: see JSCP. And Rostow. (but also to JFK/Sorensen/Henderson: ground troops, Marines.

✕ My BNSP and McNamara directive. Accompanying memos. (presented for first time)

✓ Berlin Crisis. Berlin game. (real reason for crisis: German nuclears. Steinbrunner. Trachtenberg).

✓ Visit to SAC. End of missile crisis: NIE, briefing at RAND. Leak to me on T and K. Lack of reexamination of policy, Minuteman (Garthoff). Minuteman at 1400/1000. (Ball: Keynesian reasons; my econ examiner). My "memo to Khrushchev"; Gilpatric speech (after draft to JFK rejected): "leak to Khrushchev." Possible and apparent effects! (end of Berlin crisis, origin of Cuban crisis)

Smith

Talk with McNamara (Yarmolinsky). But McNamara becomes disillusioned with "warfighting" (Kaufmann), "first strike posture": "retreats" to AD (MAD). ✓

My thesis on ambiguity; things are more uncertain than you imagine. (Later: my study of RAND R's.) *publication for development: Black; Argentina; prototype*

✓ Cuban Missile Crisis. Working groups (Rostow: cutting off oil: a ticking clock; "or how unrealistic this is.") Turkey: my revulsion at backdown! Sleeping in Nitze's office. Uncertainty over number of SU troops, or presence of warheads. Later, Nitze's estimates of probability of war: 1/10 (or more, for others). ! My belief in very low probability. Wrong.

Later study. First reaction of Nitze, McNamara; then, RFK; JFK. McNamara/JFK private agreement on blockade, then concession: Turkey, Guantanamo (like Stevenson). *"Hawaii, Italy, UK"*

✓ Real reason for K backdown: RFK second ultimatum, in ignorance of SU lack of control of AA and SAMs, and SU warheads, and SU delegation (and SU troops!) (Khrushchev having imitated our own "out of control" posture in Europe!) *(p2, ss-20; (NFS not))*

[compare: Dulles on brinkmanship; threat of loss of control; madman theory (Nixon); my political uses of madness; Days of Thunder, Nicole Kidman to Cruise: "you fantasize that you are in control, of fundamentally uncontrollable processes." (even while threatening loss of control, or undue optimism—a necessity for credibility of nuclear threats—and actually maintaining possibility of loss of control, inadvertently and deliberately)

To this day: high alert, ambiguous warning, frequency of false alarms, actual crises of false warning, Andropov, Brezhnev. *see "to cent/unist bottom, now" (Brian Gell, 1-28-13)*

Khrushchev conceals his delegation and warheads (and troops!); like Dr. Strangelove and Domsday Machine (which exists, secretly!); Saddam and delegation in Gulf War (Ritter); Saddam's deceptive behavior (fatal) in Iraq lead-up, *our delegation*

Nixon, nuclear war and me.

Quemoy crisis.

Iran crises: 1946, 1980. (Kuwait/Iraq 1958)

My study of first-use crises:

only plan to discuss SU/Russia
Real purpose of our first-strike, damage-limiting forces; why resistance to going below 1500. Relation to first-use threats, deterrence of SU second-use. Need to prevent a SU nuclear umbrella. Out-dated; except (!) for borders of Russia today: "need" to provide Ukraine and Georgia with a NATO/US nuclear umbrella against Russian conventional

attack: prevent Russia from extending a nuclear umbrella over its own forces outside its borders. At cost of maintaining Doomsday Machines on both sides. (Same effect: BMD on borders of Russia.)

are for US? R
Incentives for other countries to have nuclear forces: neglected by Countdown to Zero: as if *their* incentive to forego nuclear weapons or to reduce to zero were simply (and adequately) to induce us to forego them and eliminate the danger of all-out US-Russian war or false alarms or accidents. Does CTZ talk at all about: *on, however neighbors want to have it*

US damage=limiting, first-strike posture? and its relation to 1500 warheads? *(can be ineffective)*

US FU threats, and their relation to: US first-strike forces; and incentive for others to possess weapons?

Use of nucs by us and others to deter conventional attack? Effect of our threats of conventional attack (vs. Iran, Korea, Iraq)?

Nuclear winter?

Effects of a few weapons; effects of "small" war on ozone layer?

Likely world response to a single terrorist nuclear attack? (Need to change policy before that occurs).

Effect of terrorist attack on DC (or Moscow)? Can be handled.

Need for changes in US nuclear threat policy and posture? Hence, on global pretensions, empire? (Any mention of US as empire?) (Desire to control Middle East oil?) *(us, attack on oil) (the crisis?)*

Proliferation: France (and Samson option); Israel; INDIA 1964; Gilpatric Report (Rusk attitude: McGeorge Bundy on secrecy); Japan; Pakistan;

on discussion